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NSC Review Completed.

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NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1983  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
1:30-2:30 p.m.

AGENDA

I. Introduction

William P. Clark

II. Review of Internal Lebanon  
Situation

Ambassador McFarlane

III. Discussion of the Fundamental Choice: Distancing ourselves  
under the cover of successful cease-fire or preparing for  
long term effort to prevent Syrian dominated outcome in  
Lebanon.

IV. Discussion of Next Steps

Secretary Shultz  
(all)

A. What more can we do to promote reconciliation among  
the Lebanese factions?

1. How do we improve GOL-Shia relations?

2. What are the prospects for splitting the NSF from  
Syrian dictated positions?

3. What more can be done to cement the ceasefire  
agreement?

4. How much leeway for compromise does Gemayel have and  
how can we or the Israelis shield him from  
Phalangist pressures.

B. How can we weaken Syria's position in Lebanon?

1. Can we exploit the current crisis within the PLO to  
encourage a resumption in the Hussein-Arafat  
dialogue?

2. Can we use the current MNF mandate and the precedent  
at Suk-Al-Gharb to enlarge the vital security  
perimeter around Beirut?

3. Are we prepared to use required amounts of force to  
enforce red lines we create and discourage Assad  
from testing us.

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4. Is our support for the LAF sufficient?  
Is the level of our current and planned support a hindrance to reconciliation?
5. Can we -- or could others -- offer incentives for Turks to posture more aggressively on Syrian borders in response to Armenian terrorist strikes launched from Syria.

C. How should we deal with Israel on next steps?

1. Can we accelerate the pace of Israeli withdrawals with alternative security arrangements?
2. Should we propose a "new" and enhanced strategic relationship with Israel?
3. Should we instead, continue to support an Israeli presence in Lebanon as a means of pressuring Syrian to withdraw?
4. How should we encourage the GOL and Israel to deal with the May 17 Agreement?

D. Should we--and how would we--elevate Egypt as an alternative to Syrian leadership in the Arab world?

E. What new risks and opportunities does an intensification of the Iran-Iraq War portend?

V. Summary

William P. Clark

(Plans for Tuesday NSPG and decisions on an action-plan for Lebanon and the Middle East).

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NDDD-99 SUMMARY POINTS

STRATEGY: [We need]...a comprehensive political-military strategy which is premised on mutually reinforcing diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives...it must develop and exploit opportunities to strengthen our strategic posture in the Near East...and weaken Soviet influence, while enhancing the perception of key regional states that cooperation with the U.S. serves their national interests.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT:

-- "Our near-term military strategy should focus on defending oil fields, the transshipment points, and the sea and air lines of communication to this theater."

COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL:

"...in recognition of Israel's strategic location, developed base infrastructure, and the quality and interoperability of Israeli military forces, we will undertake to resume cooperative planning with Israel expanding on the work begun earlier..."

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